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I. INTRODUCTION
Following the devastating events of September 1 1 1h, the
Bush Administration began an all-out attack on terrorism'
commonly known as the "War on Terror., 2  Included in this
assault was the creation of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program
(TFTP) in 2001, a program designed to prevent future terrorist
attacks by identifying and monitoring the financial activity of
suspected terrorists both domestically and internationally.' A key
component to the TFTP was a secret agreement between the U.S.
government and a Swiss messaging cooperative known as the
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
(SWIFT).4  SWIFT is an organization that on a daily basis
transmits over its worldwide network millions of messages
containing detailed instructions for financial institutions on how to
transfer money and other securities. As part of this secret
agreement, the United States, through its Office of Foreign Assets
Control of the Treasury Department,6 presented SWIFT with
1. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't Treasury, Statement of Treasury Secretary
John W. Snow on Disclosure of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (June 22,
2006), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/s4332.htm.
2. Press Release, George W. Bush, President, U.S., Address to a Joint Session of
Congress and the American People (Sept. 20, 2001), available at: http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
3. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't Treasury, Terrorist Finance Tracking Program
Fact Sheet (June 23, 2006), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
js4340.htm.
4. The Terror Financing Tracking Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 109"' Cong. (2006)
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Stuart Levey, Under Secretary Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence U.S. Department of the Treasury), available at 2006 WLNR
11934277.
5. Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data Is Sifted by U.S. to Block Terror,
N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2006, at Al.
6. SWIFT, EU Parliament Hearing: Swift Statement and Press Release (2006),
available at http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?item-id=60670.
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compulsory subpoenas based on suspected links to terrorism7 and
in exchange received access to specific financial records that
contained information highlighting the identities of the sender and
recipient, the bank account numbers of each party, and theS8
amount of the transaction. This relationship, known as the
SWIFT program, was not only seen as a vital component in the
War on Terror,9 but also as an alternative method of obtaining
important financial information that bypassed traditionally
burdensome requirements, such as obtaining a search warrant
from a judge'1 or following the notification requirements of the
Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA)."
This secret program between SWIFT and the U.S.
government was fully exposed this past June when leading U.S.
newspapers published detailed reports about the relationship
between the two.12 The subsequent disclosure has ignited a series
of problems across the globe that can be broken down into four
individually distinct, but, when viewed as a whole, interrelated
categories. 3 First, the exposure of the SWIFT program highlights
ongoing communication issues between the United States and
Europe, specifically the contrasting mindsets on how to mount a
war on terrorism without sacrificing individual privacy rights. 4
Second, due to the controversy surrounding the TFTP, SWIFT
finds itself caught in the middle of an ongoing predicament
between honoring compulsory U.S. subpoenas and complying with
European privacy laws." Third, following the publicity of its
7. See Hearing, supra note 4.
8. See Glenn R. Simpson, Treasury Tracks Financial Data in Secret Program,
WALL ST. J., June 23, 2006, at Al.
9. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't Treasury, supra note 1.
10. See Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 5.
11. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3401-3422 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006); see JENNIFER K. ELSEA
& MAUREEN MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TREASURY'S TERRORIST FINANCE
PROGRAM'S ACCESS TO INFORMATION HELD BY THE SOCIETY FOR WORLDWIDE
INTERBANK FINANCIAL TELECOMMUNICATION (SWIFT) 3 (2006), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22469.pdf.
12. See, e.g., Josh Meyer & Greg Miller, Secret U.S. Program Tracks Global Bank
Transfers, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 2006, at Al.
13. See infra notes 28-178 and accompanying text.
14. See John Ward Anderson, Belgium Rules Sifting of Bank Data Illegal, WASH.
POST, Sept. 29, 2006, at A14.
15. Id.
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agreement with SWIFT, the United States not only finds itself
embroiled in controversy with the European Union, but also
defending its policies domestically as it debates with members of
Congress over the legality of the TFTP. 16  More importantly
however, the exposure of the SWIFT program forces the United
States to evaluate whether its current methods of fighting terrorist
financing are effective." Fourth, the revelation of the SWIFT
program and its ability to gather important financial information
showcases the present tension between the banking industry and
the U.S. government over current reporting requirements. 
8
Specifically, the existence of the SWIFT program provides the
banking industry with support for its assertion that the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network's (FinCEN) proposal mandating
that all international transactions be reported by banks' 9 is
unnecessary and burdensome.' °  This is because the SWIFT
program achieves the same end result that the FinCEN program is
designed to achieve2' - the identification of a suspected terrorist's
22financial activity.
Part II of this Note describes the basic framework and
functions of SWIFT, explains the creation, purpose, and authority
of the TFTP and highlights the relationship between the two.23
Part III examines the current controversy surrounding EU
concerns over potential privacy law violations committed by
SWIFT in its arrangement with the United States as well as
discussing the difficult situation in which SWIFT has found itself-
16. R. Christian Bruce, Rep. Kelly Asks GAO to Review Terrorist Finance
Tracking Program, 87 BANKING REP. 94, 94 (2006).
17. See John Sandman, Terrorist Tracking, Five Years On: Controversy Over
SWIFT May Have Been Misplaced, SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS, Sept. 25, 2006; Simpson,
supra note 8.
18. See Rob Blackwell, A Sharp Split on 'Report All Wires' Idea, AM. BANKER,
Apr. 12, 2005, at 1.
19. Press Release, Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, FinCEN Seeks Industry
Input on Feasibility of Collection of Cross-Border Wire Transfer Data (Mar. 10,
2006), available at http://www.fincen.gov/fincennewsrelease03l02006.html; see Press
Release, U.S. Dep't Treasury, supra note 3.
20. See Joe Adler, Fed to FinCEN. Weigh Cost of Transfer Report Idea; Reporting
of International Wire Transfers Proposed by Financial Crimes Enforcement Network,
AM. BANKER, July 11, 2006, at 3.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See infra notes 28-63 and accompanying text.
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stuck between the competing security interests of the United
States and the privacy interests of the European Union.24 Part IV
focuses on domestic concerns regarding SWIFT and the TFTP in
Congress25 and analyzes whether some of the current methods of
the TFTP are effective in the ongoing War on Terror.26 Lastly,
Part V discusses the present tension between the U.S. government
and the banking industry and how the SWIFT program may make
bankers' lives easier in light of the ongoing FinCEN proposal
requiring banks to report all international wire transactions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunications (SWIFT)
In its most basic sense, SWIFT is a messaging system
"overseen by a committee drawn from major central banks" and
used by banks participating in international wire transfers.29
SWIFT is owned by "banks, broker-dealers, and investment
managers," and consists of close to 8,000 worldwide financial
institutions. ° However, SWIFT is not considered a bank and does
not have individual customers; instead it acts as "an intermediary
for financial institutions.",3' In this role, rather than performing the
actual transaction, SWIFT provides instructions in the form of
messages on how to transfer money between financial institutions
32
across the globe. In a normal day, the SWIFT network handles
close to 12 million messages, and in 2005 transmitted 2.5 billion
24. See infra notes 64-100 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 101-27 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 101-27 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 128-79 and accompanying text.
28. Press Release, U.S. Dep't Treasury, supra note 3. SWIFT's committee
consists of "the U.S. Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the European Central
Bank, the Bank of Japan, and the principal director, the national Bank of Belgium."
Id.
29. See Hearing, supra note 4.
30. See Press Release, SWIFT, supra note 6.
31. Press Release, U.S. Dep't Treasury, Legal Authorities Underlying the
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (June 23, 2006), available at http://www.
ustreas.gov/press/releases/s4340.htm.
32. See Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 5.
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financial messages.33 In providing directions on how to carry out
these transactions, SWIFT has created and currently maintains
large databases of confidential information34 that include the
identities of the sender and recipient of the transaction, the bank
account numbers of the parties, and the amount of the
transaction.35 Since SWIFT databases-some of which are located
in the United States-contain secret financial information, the
organization places a premium on securing the confidentiality of
its users' information16 and prides itself on its reputation as one the
safest networks in the world.37
B. The Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP)
Following September 1 1 1h, President Bush declared a
national emergency in order to deal with the effects of the terrorist
attacks while at the same time taking the necessary steps to
prevent future strikes."' In implementing these preventive
measures, the President issued Executive Order 13224"9 which
granted the U.S. Treasury Department the discretion and
authority "to use all appropriate measures to identify, track, and
pursue not only those persons who commit terrorist acts here and
abroad, but also those who provide financial or other support for
terrorist activity. '  In exercising its newfound powers, the
Treasury Department created the TFTP in order to identify,
monitor, and follow suspected terrorists, as well as individuals and
organizations that finance suspected terrorists.
The ability of the President to issue an executive order and
then delegate that authority to the Treasury Department
33. See Meyer & Miller, supra note 12.
34. Id.
35. See Simpson, supra note 8.
36. See Press Release, Soc'y for Worldwide Interbank Fin. Telecomm., Update
and Q&A to SWIFT's 23 June 2006 Statement on Compliance (Apr. 25, 2006),
available at http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?item-id=60275.
37. See Meyer & Miller, supra note 12. A former SWIFT executive said that
SWIFT "is arguably the most secure network on the planet," and even compared the
security of SWIFT's databases to Fort Knox. Id.
38. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't Treasury, supra note 31.
39. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
40. Press Release, U.S. Dep't Treasury, supra note 3.
41. Id.
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originated in part under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA)42 and the United Nations Participation Act
(UNPA).43 The IEEPA allows the President-after declaring a
state of emergency based on the presence of an extraordinary
threat to the security of the United States-to employ a wide-
range of powers.44 Included in this authority is the ability to access
financial transactions or transfers occurring between banking
institutions that "involve any interest of any foreign country or a
national thereof. 45 Likewise, the UNPA authorizes the President
to "implement measures ordered by the United Nations Security
Council,"46  such as monitoring financial relationships and
transactions between foreigners and the United States.47
Consequently, the Treasury Department quickly created the TFTP
in order to identify and monitor the financial transactions of
suspected terrorists and those individuals or organizations that
financed them.8
C. The Relationship Between SWIFT and the TFTP
Ironically, when the TFTP was created, members of the
Bush Administration were unaware of the vast amount of valuable
financial data contained in SWIFT's databases.4 9 This source of
information was not recognized until a Wall Street executive
suggested to a key member of the administration that accessing
SWIFT's databases could be a valuable tool in the War on
Terror. °  This suggestion hit home with the administration,
especially because evidence uncovered after September 1 1 th
showed that nine out of the eleven terrorists received money to
help fund the deadly plot via international wire transfers from
42. 50 U.S.C.A §§1701-1706 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006).
43. See ELSEA & MURPHY, supra note 11, at 3-5.
44. Id. at 2. The President can "exercise broad powers over property or financial
transactions, including transfers of credit or payments through banking institutions
and securities or other obligations." Id.
45. 50 U.S.C.A § 1702(a)(1)(A)(ii).
46. ELSEA & MURPHY, supra note 11, at 5.
47. 22 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000).
48. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't Treasury, supra note 3.
49. See Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 5.
50. Id.
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Europe and the Middle East to banks in the United States.1
Consequently, as soon as the administration learned that it could
identify and monitor terrorist activity by accessing SWIFT's
financial records that included information on international
transfers, the Treasury Department began to obtain financial
information from SWIFT through the use of compulsory
52
subpoenas.
As noted by Treasury officials, the use of compulsory
subpoenas (also known as administrative subpoenas) is a novel
concept.53 Whereas access to individual financial records typically
occurs through the issuance of a subpoena that has first been
approved for example by a grand jury, compulsory subpoenas
bypass this procedural requirement.55 Instead, Treasury officials
create a compulsory subpoena pursuant to their delegated powers
16from the President that originate under the IEEPA, present the
subpoena to SWIFT officials, and obtain access to specific
financial records in SWIFT's databases as long as there is a
suspected link to terrorism.57 Additionally, due to its substantial
business and operations in the United States, SWIFT is subject to
federal jurisdiction and is required to cooperate with these
compulsory subpoenas."'
Yet, in administering these broad subpoenas, U.S. officials
do not have complete freedom to browse through all of SWIFT's
financial records.59 Instead, the subpoenas only grant U.S. officials
access to specific financial files that have some relationship to
either a terrorist or a terrorist organization.6 In addition to this
limitation placed on government officials, additional safeguards
51. Id.
52. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't Treasury, supra note 31.
53. See Simpson, supra note 8.
54. See Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 5.
55. See Simpson, supra note 8.
56. See Hearing, supra note 4. IEEPA "allows the government to compel the
production of information pursuant to Presidential declarations of national
emergency." Id.
57. Id.
58. See Press Release, Soc'y for Worldwide Interbank Fin. Telecomm., supra
note 36. For example, SWIFT must abide by lawful U.S. subpoenas because one of
its financial databases is located in the U.S. See Simpson, supra note 8.
59. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't Treasury, supra note 3.
60. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't Treasury, supra note 31.
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were put in place in order to prevent abuse of financial
information and allow SWIFT some level of control over the
subpoenaed data." These protective mechanisms include the
presence of SWIFT representatives who oversee all searches and
possess the authority to stop any and all searches that they feel do
62not have a sufficient link to terrorism. Additionally, each search
is recorded and reviewed by both an internal and external auditor
to ensure that the searches are limited to financial activities related
to terrorism. 63
III. SWIFT PROGRAM IGNITES CONCERNS IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION
A. Controversy in Europe
The public revelation of the TFTP's use of SWIFT's
financial databases highlights the ongoing communication flaws
between the United States and Europe, specifically the differing
views on how to balance the demands of fighting terrorism 64 with
the protection of individual privacy rights.6  EU governments'
disapproval of the TFTP's use of SWIFT can be traced to two
reasons: (1) high-ranking European governmental officials were
66unaware of the SWIFT program until American newspapers
revealed its existence in June of 2006;6' and (2) the SWIFT
61. See Press Release, Soc'y for Worldwide Interbank Fin. Telecomm., supra
note 36.
62. See Hearing, supra note 4.
63. See Press Release, Soc'y for Worldwide Interbank Fin. Telecomm., supra
note 36.
64. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't Treasury, supra note 3.
65. See Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 5. Top United States officials do not
believe that individuals have a privacy interest in their financial information
contained in international wire transactions. Id. On the other hand, German officials
believe European law places a greater emphasis on privacy laws than does the United
States. Niels C. Sorrells, German Data Security Officials Question SWIFT System
Security, 87 BANKING REP. 795, 795-96 (2006).
66. Bengt Ljung, Belgian Leader Says SWIFT Broke Law by Providing Bank
Transfer Data to U.S., 87 BANKING REP. 496, 496-97 (2006).
67. See ELSEA & MURPHY, supra note 11, at 1.
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program, according to EU officials, violates European privacy
laws.68
A report from the European Parliament echoed what other
European countries and governmental bodies had been saying
about the SWIFT program-that the relationship involved
violations of "various articles of the EU data protection rules,
especially ones that require private persons to be made aware that
their data is being transferred., 70  Additionally, officials have
voiced their displeasure with the SWIFT program by noting that
according to European law, confidential personal data may only be
transferred to another country if that country provides adequate
protections; the principal problem being that European
governments do not believe the United States offers sufficient
protections to financial records.71
Although EU governments and officials are concerned
over purported privacy violations, the real source of their
frustration appears to be the simple fact that many of them were
not aware of the existence of the SWIFT program.7" In other
words, it is possible that they are upset because they were not
important enough to be included in the secret agreement.73
Although this assumption may appear to be childish, it is
supported by the fact that SWIFT's attempts to respond to the
68. See Joe Kirwin, Trichet Calls for Wire Transfer Pact Addressing Anti-Terror,
Data Protection Needs, 97 BANKING REP. 544, 544 (2006).
69. See Sorrells, supra note 65. German Data Security officials concluded in a
study of their own that SWIFT violated German and European Union protection
laws and highlighted the fact that European law has higher privacy standards than
American law does. Id.
70. See Kirwin, supra note 68.
71. SWIFT hits back at EU criticism, ELECTRONIC PAYMENTS INT'L, Oct. 24, 2006,
at 1.
72. See Anderson, supra note 14.
73. Id. Belgium's Data Privacy Commission released a 20-page report stating
that at least European officials should have been notified of the SWIFT program
from the very beginning. Id. In addition to being upset at SWIFT, the supervisor of
European Data Protection was also angered that the European Central Bank (ECB),
who had knowledge of the SWIFT program, chose not to inform other leading
officials. See Ljung, supra note 66. The Prime Minister of Belgium also believed that
the current problem could have been made easier had SWIFT officials notified
European institutions and the Belgian government in order "to anticipate and discuss
additional guarantees." Id.
2007]
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Belgian Commission's report on potential violations were not
granted until after the report went public.
7 4
Interestingly enough, even in light of purported privacy
violations and adamant discontent with being excluded from the
existence of the SWIFT program, European governments are not
taking, nor do they plan to take, any legal action against SWIFT or
the United States." Instead, they agree that the program's
existence is vital to preventing terrorism, yet have requested that
the United States and European Union find a way to bring the
program into compliance with European law. 6 In other words,
EU governments seek a concrete agreement on how to effectively
fight terrorism while at the same time protecting Europeans'
individual privacy rights.77 SWIFT officials have echoed this
sentiment. 8
While some European governments have called for U.S.
participation in order to solve the current problem, other
European governments have developed possible solutions that do
not involve American cooperation.7 9  German privacy officials
have offered three possible answers to the privacy concerns facing
SWIFT suggesting that (1) SWIFT move all of its data servers to
European countries and out of the United States so that the
financial information stored on the databases would be subject
only to European privacy laws; (2) there be a higher level of
encryption on the financial information so that U.S. officials
cannot view the information; and (3) all banks inform their
customers that under the current system their financial
information may not be secure.80 Although all three resolutions
seem viable, the officials themselves have acknowledged the
74. See SWIFT hits back at EU criticism, supra note 71.
75. See Anderson, supra note 14.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Sarah Litner & Michael Peel, SWIFT Post-9/11 Privacy Breach, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2006, International Economy and Americas at 8. SWIFT wants a quick
resolution to the controversy between the United States and European Union
regarding potential privacy violations and representatives of the messaging
organization have been adamant in voicing their desire for the creation and
implementation of a mechanism that provides SWIFT with "legal security" when
dealing with future requests of financial information by the United States. Id.
79. See Sorrells, supra note 65.
80. Id.
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unlikelihood of their solutions gaining much support within the
German banking industry since implementing any of these rules
could potentially ban certain banks from offering international
transactions and consequently harm business.81 Interestingly, it is
important to note that in all three instances, German privacy
officials focused solely on privacy issues rather than evaluating
what effects these potential solutions would have on helping or
harming the prevention of future terrorist attacks.82
B. SWIFT: Caught in the Middle of the Controversy
Stuck in the middle between the European Union's fight
for privacy and the United States' War on Terror, SWIFT faces
the difficult proposition of abiding by compulsory U.S. subpoenas83
while at the same time walking the fine line of not violating
European privacy laws.84 Since SWIFT maintains business, offices,
and databases both in Europe and in the United States, the
organization is subject to both American 85 and European
jurisdiction.86
As a result of the controversy over the SWIFT program,
SWIFT has experienced problems in its relationship with EU
87governments. SWIFT took great offense to the barrage of
accusations88 aimed at the messaging service accusing SWIFT of
repeatedly violating European privacy laws by granting U.S.
officials access to its financial databases.89 Whether in response to
a report from the Belgian national data protection authority,9° an
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Press Release, US Dep't Treasury, supra note 31.
84. See Kirwin, supra note 68.
85. See Press Release, Soc'y for Worldwide Interbank Fin. Telecomm., supra
note 36.
86. See Kirwin, supra note 68.
87. See Ljung, supra note 66. Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt said that
SWIFT violated its obligations relating to protecting personal privacy information
under Belgian law. Id.
88. Id.
89. See SWIFT hits back at EU criticism, supra note 71.
90. See Kirwin, supra note 68.
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accusation from EU data protection officials, 9' or a study from
German privacy officials92 (all three of which accused SWIFT of
violating European privacy laws), SWIFT has remained adamant
in its stance that it complies with applicable European and
American laws when providing information to the United States.93
Additionally, SWIFT notes that it has received repeated
assurances from the United States that the information it turns
over is only being used in terrorism investigations94 and that the
information is protected in a secure environment.95 Yet, this
explanation is not sufficient in the eyes of some EU governments. 96
In its most basic sense, the disagreement between EU
governments and SWIFT regarding compliance with European
privacy laws can be explained by a difference in interpretation of
what type of messaging service SWIFT is and, consequently, what
European privacy laws are applicable.97 For example, according to
Belgian law, whether or not an organization is subject to certain
privacy laws depends on its classification as either a data processor
or a data controller. 98  Financial institutions that act as data
controllers have a contractual obligation to protect their client's
financial information whereas financial institutions labeled as data
processors do not.99 SWIFT claims that since it is not a bank and
as a result neither carries out the transaction nor acts as a financial
institution, it is considered a data processor and is exempt from
specific Belgian privacy laws.1 °°
91. Joe Kirwin, EU Data Privacy Officials Probing Possible Data Protection
Breaches in SWIFT Matter, 87 BANKING REP. 238, 238 (2006).
92. See Sorrells, supra note 65.
93. See SWIFT hits back at EU criticism, supra note 71.
94 Id.
95. See Press Release, Soc'y for Worldwide Interbank Fin. Telecomm., supra
note 36. Subpoenaed data is stored in an extremely secure environment and is
treated with the highest security and confidentiality according to SWIFT. Id.
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IV. CONCERNS REGARDING SWIFT AND THE TFTP IN THE U.S.
CONGRESS
The subsequent exposure of the arrangement between the
U.S. government and SWIFT highlights the United States' own
internal communication struggles with Congress 1 and also
questions the effectiveness and legality of the government's
current methods of the T-FP.'0 2 Up until the June 2006 newspaper
reports exposed the existence of the SWIFT program as part of the
TFTP,10 3 only certain members of Congress knew about the
relationship between SWIFT and the Treasury Department) °4
However, in citing the requirements of IEEPA,10 5 other members
of Congress (like many of their European counterparts),' °6 felt that
they were not adequately informed about the program's existence
and the methods in which the program obtained financial
information."
A. Controversy Within Congress over Legality of SWIFT
Program
Not only is there debate over whether Congress was
properly informed of the SWIFT program, there is also evidence
supporting the assertion that members of Congress are currently
split on whether the TFTP is legally valid; specifically whether the
SWIFT program violates U.S. citizens' privacy rights when the
101. See Bruce, supra note 16.
102. See ELSEA & MURPHY, supra note 11, at 2-3.
103. See Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 5.
104. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't Treasury, supra note 31. Stuart Levey, Under
Secretary Terrorism and Financial Intelligence in the U.S. Department of the
Treasury, testified that congress was properly informed of the Terrorist Finance
Tracking Program which included the SWIFT program. Id.
105. See Bruce, supra note 16. As the legal foundation for the compulsory
subpoenas issued to SWIFT, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA) contained congressional notification requirements that were not sufficiently
followed according to House Financial Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee
Chair Sue Kelly. Id.
106. See Ljung, supra note 66.
107. See Bruce, supra note 16. The IEEPA mandates that "the President, in every
possible instance, shall consult with Congress before exercising any of the authorities
granted by this chapter and shall consult regularly with the Congress so long as such
authorities are exercised." 50 U.S.C.A. § 1703 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006).
2007]
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financial records pertain to Americans.'0 8 Historically speaking,
the Constitution itself does not provide any inherent protection
"against governmental access to financial information turned over
to third parties. ' 9 In response to this, Congress passed the Right
to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (RFPA), which granted
individuals some protection from the government accessing their
financial records. 10  Normally, the RFPA mandates that
individuals receive notice from government officials when they
seek access to their individual financial information.1" In addition
to providing notice to the individual, officials must present the
financial institutions with a device such as an administrative
subpoena in order to obtain access to the customer's financial
information."2  However, these requirements only pertain to
depository institutions such as banks."3  Since U.S. officials
determined that SWIFT is considered a banking cooperative and
not a bank, the protections of individuals' financial privacy rights
as documented in the RFPA do not apply when the Treasury
Department issues compulsory subpoenas to SWIFT in exchange
for access to confidential financial information.14 Thus, one of the
principal advantages of compulsory subpoenas is that officials do
not have to present administrative subpoenas to banks nor do they
have to give notice to the suspected individual whose financial
records they wish to access."'
While on its face this legal analysis by government officials
appears to be valid, even high ranking Treasury Department
officials admit that the use of broad, compulsory subpoenas in an
acknowledged financial "grey area"1 6 is a method of accessing
financial data that has not previously been attempted. 7
108. See Bruce, supra note 16.
109. See ELSEA & MURPHY, supra note 11.
110. See Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 5.
111. Id.
112. 12 U.S.C.S. §§ 3405, 3408 (2006); see Hearing, supra note 4. Also known as a
compulsory subpoena, an administrative subpoena is an order that compels an
individual or organization to provide certain information. See Simpson, supra note 8.
113. 12 U.S.C.S. § 3401 (2006).
114. See Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 5.
115. See ELSEA & MURPHY, supra note 11 ; Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 5.
116. See Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 5.
117. See Simpson, supra note 8.
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Consequently, members of Congress remain split on the issue. '18
For example, immediately following the June 2006 news
revelations, the House of Representatives demonstrated its
support of the TFTP by passing House Resolution 895, which
specifically supports intelligence and law enforcement programs
that track terrorists and their finances such as the TFTP.119
However, shortly thereafter, other members of Congress who
feared potential privacy violations ordered an investigation (the
results of which have not yet been released) into the legality of the
TFTP.
120
B. Is the SWIFT Program an Effective Component of the
TFTP?
One looming question regarding the exposure of the
SWIFT program is whether or not the program remains an
effective tool in the War on Terror. 12' For the most part,
government officials believe the exposure of the TFTP's
relationship with SWIFT damaged 22 a successful terrorist
123financing tracking program with documented results. Yet, these
same officials believe that the SWIFT program will continue to be
an effective tool in the War on Terror by identifying lower to mid-
level terrorists and their financers - individuals who believe they
can elude detection by using international wire transactions to
118. See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
119. H.R. Res. 895, 109th Cong. (2006).
120. See Bruce, supra note 16. Chair of the House Financial Oversight and
Investigations Subcommittee requested that Comptroller General David M. Walker
conduct an investigation about the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program "to ensure
that it was indeed conducted in accordance with all proper laws, that it does possess
all necessary safeguards, and that Congress was adequately informed." Id.
121. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't Treasury, supra note 31.
122. See Simpson, supra note 8. In a statement to the Wall Street Journal, Stuart
Levey admitted that he feared that "sophisticated terrorists will now stop using the
system in ways we have access to, or will take extensive precautions to hide their
identities, and that is really a loss." Id.
123. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't Treasury, supra note 31. TFTP helped capture
the terrorist known as Hambali, the mastermind behind the 2002 Bali bombings. Id.
SWIFT program also had domestic success when it helped capture and convict a
Brooklyn man, Uzair Paracha, for providing funds to an Al Qaeda operative in
Pakistan when he agreed to channel $200,000 to a terrorist cell through a Karachi
bank in 2005. See Lichtblau & Risen, supra note 5.
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transfer funds. However, others note that the SWIFT program is
an example of an outdated messaging system'25 that sophisticated
terrorists no longer use. Interestingly, Treasury officials
themselves have acknowledged the overall trend of terrorists
moving away from typical international wire transfers and instead
relying on cash couriers and other informal methods of
transferring money.
12 7
V. SWIFT PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS CONCERNS WITHIN BANKING
INDUSTRY
A. Current Reporting Requirements for Banks
The banking industry is subject to such reporting
requirements as those implemented under the Bank Secrecy Act
(BSA)1 28 and Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act.129 Passed in
1970, the BSA mandates that banks maintain records and file
reports containing information relating to criminal, tax, and
regulatory matters.1 30  After these documents are filed with
FinCEN,"' international and domestic law enforcement agencies,
112the Federal Reserve, and other bank supervisory agencies
inspect the reports in order "to identify, detect and deter money
laundering whether it is in furtherance of a criminal enterprise,
124. See Meyer & Miller, supra note 12.
125. Dan Barnes, Is Swift Living in the Past?, THE BANKER, Oct. 1, 2006, at 20.
126. See Sandman, supra note 17.
127. See Hearing, supra note 4.
128. 12 U.S.C. § 1829(b) (2000).
129. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318A (West 2000 & Supp. 2006); see ELSEA & MURPHY, supra
note 11, at 4.
130. Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Dep't Treasury, Suspicious Activity Reports,
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=154555,00.html (last visited Jan. 25,
2007).
131. See The Bank Secrecy and the USA PATRIOT Act: H. Before the Comm. on
Int'l Relations, 107th Cong. (2004) (statement of Herbert A. Biern, Senior Associate
Director Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2004/20041117/default.htm. Even
though the Treasury Department has statutory authority to oversee the BSA, it has
elected to delegate this regulatory authority to FinCEN, a bureau of the Treasury
Department. Id. With this power, FinCEN informs banks about regulations, offers
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terrorism, tax evasion or other unlawful activity."'33  Passed in
response to September 1 1 th, the USA PATRIOT Act includes anti-
money laundering laws that increase the various customer
identification requirements for banks under the BSA while
simultaneously criminalizing the financing of terrorism.'
3 4
In following the BSA and the purpose of the USA
PATRIOT Act,1 35 banks must file suspicious activity reports
(SARs) 36 when they detect a violation of the BSA or observe a
suspicious transaction related to money laundering.'37 In relation
to terrorism, SARs are seen as an effective tool in the War on
Terror"' since banks must file SARs if they identify suspicious
activities related to terrorist financing.' The triggers for filing a
SAR include when "the funds come from illegal activity or
disguise funds from illegal activity; the transaction is structured to
evade BSA requirements or appears to serve no known business
or apparent lawful purpose; or the money services businesses
(MSB) is being used to facilitate criminal activity.' ' 40 The penalty
for failing to file a SAR can be severe. 4' For example, in October
of 2005, AmSouth Bank was fined $40 million by the U.S.
Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Mississippi for
failing to file SARs.'
41
Scared over potential prosecution and heavy fines and
uncertain about when reporting requirements such as those of a
SAR apply, banks have pointed to SARs as an example of the
133. Id.
134. Id. The PATRIOT Act prohibits banks from participating in business affairs
with foreign shell banks, mandates that banks increase their protective mechanisms
for accounts involving foreign correspondents and private banking accounts, and calls
for a better relationship between banks and the U.S. government regarding the
sharing of financial information. Id.
135. 50 U.S.C.S. § 1861 (2001).
136. 31 U.S.C.A § 5318A (West 2000 & Supp. 2006).
137. 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (2000).
138. See Internal Revenue Service, supra note 130.
139. Trends and Analysis: Terrorist Financing Suspicious Activity Reports, SAR
Activity Rev. (FinCEN, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2005, at 5-6, available at
http://www.fincen.gov/sarreviewissue8.pdf.
140. See Internal Revenue Service, supra note 130.
141. Rob Blackwell, FinCEN Figures Show SAR Glut is Worsening, AM. BANKER,
Apr. 15, 2005, at 1.
142. Id.
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problems with the current reporting requirements.43 Specifically,
banking industry officials believe that law enforcement agencies
are ill-suited to properly handle and search for criminal activity in
the large amount of information that banks are currently required
to provide. 44 In addition, members of the banking industry believe
that in some instances law enforcement agencies are not even
analyzing the information that they report.1 45  FinCEN, which
receives the reports from the banks, has responded to these
criticisms by claiming that any shortcoming on its part to properly
scan financial information for potential criminal activity is a direct
result of the banking industry's increase of unnecessary and
defensive SARs.' 46 Even though banking officials themselves have
accepted blame for the huge number of SARs,147 it appears that
until reporting requirements are made clear, banks will continue to
file more and more SARs and law enforcement agencies will
arguably struggle to properly analyze the data.148 Consequently,
potential terrorists could fall through the cracks. 49
B. Criticizing the FinCEN Proposal
Although the disclosure of the SWIFT program has
provided the banking industry with an opportunity to criticize
current banking requirements, it has primarily allowed the banking
industry to condemn and denounce FinCEN's proposal mandating
that banks report all international wire transactions. 50  The
Intelligence Reform and Prevention Act of 2004"' authorized the
143. Id.
144. Rob Blackwell, Reacting to SWIFT: Hot, Cold, and Both: Some Back Efforts
as Others Cite Privacy; Fed Is Subpoenaed; Reaction to Government Monitoring of
International Wire Transfers, AM. BANKER, June 26, 2006, at 1.
145. Stacy Kaper, 2d Thoughts at FinCEN About Extra Wire Data, AM. BANKER,
Apr. 24, 2006, at 5.
146. See Blackwell, supra note 141.
147. Id. Statistics show that banks filed record levels of SARs in March of 2005
with 43,549 reports, a 40% increase over the previous March. Id.
148. See Blackwell, supra note 141; Blackwell, supra note 144.
149. See Blackwell, supra note 141; Blackwell, supra note 144; Kaper, supra note
145.
150. See Kaper, supra note 145.
151. Intelligence Reform and Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118
Stat. 3638 (codified at 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318(n)(1) (2006)).
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Secretary of the Treasury Department to mandate (and which was
mandated) that certain financial institutions such as banks report
to FinCEN all international wire transactions.152 The purpose of
this requirement was to obtain important information regarding
terrorist funding and money laundering.153 Before this mandate
can take effect, however, the IRPA requires that a feasibility study
be performed by FinCEN that outlines: (1) situations in which
financial information would be relevant to a terrorist investigation;
(2) the form, content, and frequency of such reports from banks;
(3) the necessary technology required for FinCEN to properly
analyze the information and delegate the information to other law
enforcement agencies for analysis; and (4) the required
information security protections. 54 After completing the study,
FinCEN must then give the report to Congress as well as to the
Treasury Secretary who is responsible for the final approval.155
While FinCEN has completed its study and presented it to the
Treasury Secretary for approval, FinCEN officials have publicly
announced that there is no way that the changes will take place by
the end of 2007 and instead any new approved regulations will be
implemented over time.156 Although the specifics of the feasibility
study have not been released to the public, the common
understanding among FinCEN officials and members of the
banking industry is that the proposal broadly requires banks to
report all international wire transfers.157
As recognized by both banking and FinCEN officials, the
government does not want to impose unnecessary reporting
burdens on financial institutions.'58 Yet, whether or not the
152. Id. § 6302, 118 Stat. at 3748-49 (codified at 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318(n)(1) (2006)).
153. See FinCEN Seeks Industry Input on Feasibility of Collection of Cross-Border
Wire Transfer Data, BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP., June 2006, at 24.
154. Intelligence Reform and Prevention Act § 6302, 118 Stat. at 3749 (codified at
31 U.S.C.A. § 5318(n)(4)(A) (2006)).
155. R. Christian Bruce, Money Laundering: Treasury Reviews Proposal to
Require Reporting Cross-Border Wire Transfers, 87 BNA BANKING REP. 553, 553
(2006).
156. Id. Initially, if any new reporting regulations were to be implemented, they
were to take place before December 2007. Intelligence Reform and Prevention Act §
6302, 118 Stat. at 3750 (codified at 31 U.S.C.A. § 5318(n)(5)(A) (2006)).
157. See Adler, supra note 20.
158. FinCEN Seeks Industry Input on Feasibility of Collection of Cross-Border
Wire Transfer Data, supra note 153.
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proposal presents the banking industry with needless regulations
depends on which party you ask.159 From a banking perspective,
there are four primary criticisms of the FinCEN reporting
proposal: (1) the report does not take into consideration the
potential economic effect on banks in terms of replacing below-par
technology systems with new and improved technology systems
capable of distinguishing between domestic and international wire
transfers; 16° (2) requiring this kind of technology system may
prevent financial institutions from remaining competitive in the
global market since the FinCEN proposal could potentially
prohibit U.S. financial institutions from creating and using cutting-
edge payment systems;161 (3) the FinCEN reporting requirement is
unnecessary in light of the fact that the SWIFT program achieves
the same end result 162 by identifying and monitoring the financial. • . 163
activity of terrorists; and (4) as evidenced by law enforcement
agencies' supposed difficulty in analyzing and handling the vast
number of SARs,' 64 industry officials are unsure how law
enforcement officials could possibly handle the additional
workload caused by the new FinCEN reporting proposal.
65
In recognizing the banking industry's concerns regarding
the new proposal such as those relating to compliance costs, the
effect on the U.S. electronic transfer system as a whole, and
• • 166
privacy protections, high ranking FinCEN officials have
responded vaguely by saying that these concerns will be addressed
159. See infra notes 161-75 and accompanying text.
160. See Kaper, supra note 145. According to experts in the banking industry, the
current wire structure of some banks presents a challenge in complying with a
proposal requiring banks to report all international wire transactions- namely that
the existing wire structure is varied and "much of it doesn't enable institutions to
report the difference between cross-border and domestic wire transfers," according
to Richard Riese, the director of the American Bankers Association's Center for
Regulatory Compliance. Id.
161. See Adler, supra note 20. This was an argument proposed by the Federal
Reserve Board, suggesting that this potential effect be taken into consideration while
FinCEN performed its study. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't Treasury, supra note 3.
164. See Blackwell, supra note 18. For U.S. banks, officials estimate that both
domestically and internationally there are 500 million wire transfers a year. Id.
165. See Kaper, supra note 145.
166. Stacy Kaper, Agencies Criticize Idea of Reports on Wire Transfers, AM.
BANKER, June 21, 2006, at 3.
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in the future. 167 Yet, FinCEN officials have been more elaborate in
addressing other concerns. ' 68 For example, FinCEN officials have
been quick to cite the importance of an all-international-wires-
reporting requirement in furtherance of protecting economic and
169national security. In addition to highlighting the security
benefits of the proposal, FinCEN has attempted to calm the
banking industry's concerns over the potential wide application of
the new reporting requirement to banks of all sizes by implying
that in all likelihood the reporting requirement will apply only to
larger financial institutions that are regularly involved in
international wire transactions.70  Lastly, FinCEN officials have
openly attempted to distinguish the new reporting proposal from
SWIFT and SARs by arguing that the all-international-wires-
reporting requirement is a supplement to areas of financial
information not currently covered by SARs and other reports.
17 1
However, FinCEN's attempt to convince bankers that the
reporting efforts of the SWIFT program are different than those of
the new proposal appears, at first glance, to be unconvincing.1
7
1
This lack of explanation can arguably be traced to the
government's reluctance to expose even more details on the
operation of the SWIFT program-a program that the government
still uses and views as a valuable tool in the War on Terror.
173
Overall, neither the banking industry nor FinCEN officials
have offered detailed evidence in support of their respective
assertions that the SWIFT reporting requirement and the FinCEN
reporting requirement do or do not achieve the same end result. 74
Instead, the only definitive information that both parties seem to
acknowledge is that the FinCEN proposal appears to have an
167. See Bruce, supra note 155.
168. See, e.g., FinCEN Seeks Industry Input on Feasibility of Collection of Cross-
Border Wire Transfer Data, supra note 153.
169. Id.
170. See Bruce, supra note 155. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Director
Robert Werner said that if the FinCEN proposal is approved, "probably fewer than
100 U.S. institutions would be directly affected." Id.
171. See id.
172. Id. At a conference, FinCEN Director Robert Werner merely said that the
"reporting effort[s]" under FinCEN would be different than those under SWIFT;
ultimately declining to discuss specific questions about the SWIFT program. Id.
173. See Hearing, supra note 4.
174. See Adler, supra note 20; Bruce, supra note 155.
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across-the-board requirement of reporting all international wire
transactions regardless of the size of the transaction, the parties
involved, and whether there is any relationship to terrorism."' On
the other hand, as explained by the Treasury Department, the
SWIFT program involves a much more narrow type of financial
information which requires a suspected link to terrorism in order
176to access.
VI. CONCLUSION
For over five years the U.S. government and the SWIFT
cooperative maintained a secret arrangement 77  in which
government officials had access to specific financial records stored
in SWIFT's vast databases as long as SWIFT received a
compulsory subpoena and the requested seaich was related to
terrorism.118 The U.S. government viewed this relationship as an
essential tool in the War on Terror 7 9 that was both easily
accessible and had proven results.'9 However, this secret
relationship was exposed this past summer as various newspapers
publicized stories relating to the arrangement."' While the
purpose of the exposure was in all likelihood to address potential
181privacy concerns for U.S. citizens, the reality is that the news
articles opened the door and revealed current controversies
involving the European Union, SWIFT, the U.S. banking industry,
183and the U.S. government. Although each controversy involves an
element of uncertainty, available evidence in each situation
permits a likely prediction of future events.
One, while EU nations continue to criticize the SWIFT
program,8 the fact that they have not pursued nor do they plan to
175. See Adler, supra note 20; Blackwell, supra note 144; Bruce, supra note 155.
176. See Hearing, supra note 4.
177. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
181. See Meyer & Miller, supra note 12.
182. See Bruce, supra note 16.
183. See supra notes 13-22 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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pursue any legal action against SWIFT or the United States'85
supports the assertion that the United States will continue to
present SWIFT officials with compulsory subpoenas and,
consequently, SWIFT will continue to turn over financial
information. 86
Additionally, while SWIFT continues to face a difficult
dilemma regarding which party's interests will prevail (the national
security interests of the United States or the privacy concerns of
the European Union), 187 it appears that SWIFT will continue to
obey the compulsory subpoenas of the United States.188
And although there appears to be some lingering
unsettlement over the legality of the SWIFT program and whether
it violates personal privacy laws, U.S. government officials believe
the program is an essential tool in the War on Terror and in all
likelihood will continue to obtain specific financial information
through the use of compulsory subpoenas. 189
Lastly, while the exposure of the SWIFT program has given
members of the banking industry evidence to claim that a current
FinCEN proposal mandating that banks report all international
wire transactions is unnecessary, '90 the revelation also highlights
the tension between banks and law enforcement agencies relating
to current reporting requirements.' 9' While banks and FinCEN
officials continue to argue over the effectiveness of current
reporting requirements, FinCEN has given no indication that it
plans to decrease the reporting requirements for banks in the near
future.92 If anything, it is possible that banks will have even
greater reporting requirements if the FinCEN proposal is
approved. 93 Thus, new reporting requirements on top of currently
disputed mandates could spell trouble for the War on Terror-as
banks continue to file more and more SARs and law enforcement
185. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 83-100 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 116-19, 124-27 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 135-49 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 150-76 and accompanying text.
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agencies arguably struggle to properly analyze the data, 94 the
potential for terrorists and their related financial activity could fall
through the cracks.'9
JEREMY S. SHRADER
194. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
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